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Quantum game theory is the study of strategic behavior by agents with access to quantum technology.
Broadly speaking, this technology can be employed in either of two ways: As part of a randomization device
or as part of a communications protocol.
When it is used for randomization, quantum technology allows players to coordinate their strategies
in certain ways. The equilibria that result are all correlated equilibria in the sense of Aumann [A], but
they form a particularly interesting subclass of correlated equilibria, namely those that are both achievable
and deviation-proof when players have access to certain naturally defined technologies. Not all correlated
equilibria can be implemented via quantum strategies, and of those that can, not all are quantum-deviation-
proof.
When players have access to private information, the theories of correlated and quantum equilibrium
diverge still further, with the classical equivalence between mixed and behavioral strategies breaking down,
and the appearance of new equilibria that have no classical counterparts.
The second game theoretic application of quantum technology, other than randomization, is to com-
munication. This leads to a new set of equilibria that seem to have no natural interpretation in terms of
correlated equilibria or any other classical concepts.
In Section I below, we will review the elements of game theory, with special emphasis on those aspects
that are generalized or modified by quantum phenomena. In Section II, we survey games with quantum
randomization and in Section III, we survey games with quantum communication.
I. Game Theory
IA. Games.
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A two-person game consists of two sets S1 and S2 and two maps
P1 : S1 × S2 → R P2 : S1 × S2 → R
where R denotes the real numbers. The sets Si are called strategy sets and the functions Pi are called payoff
functions . Games are intended to model strategic interactions between agents who are usually called players
(though the players are not part of this formal definition). The value Pi(x, y) is called the payoff to Player
i when Player 1 chooses strategy x and Player 2 chooses strategy y.
For simplicity, we will usually assume the sets Si are finite.
A solution concept is a function that associates to each game a subset of S1×S2; the idea is to pick out
those pairs of strategies that we believe players might select in real world situations modeled by the game.
The appropriate solution concept depends on the intended application. The most studied solution concept
is Nash equilibrium. A pair (x, y) is called a Nash equilibrium if x maximizes the function P1(−, y) and y
maximizes the function P2(x,−).
IB. Mixed Strategies
To provide an accurate model of real world strategic situations, we must allow for the possibility that
players might bend the rules. For example, instead of choosing a single strategy, one or both players might
randomize. Starting with a game G, we model this possibility by constructing the associated mixed strategy
game G mixed in which the strategy space Si is replaced with the set Ω(Si) of probability distributions on
Si, and the payoff function Pi is replaced with the function
Pmixedi : (µ, ν) 7→
∫
Pi(x, y)dµ(x)dν(y)
Although G mixed is not the same game as G, it is traditional to refer to a Nash equilibrium in
G mixed as a mixed strategy equilibrium in the game G.
An alternative but equivalent model would allow player i to choose not a probability distribution on Si
but an Si-valued random variable from some allowable set. This is the approach we will generalize in what
follows.
IC. Correlated Strategies
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In the play of G mixed, we can imagine that Player i first selects a probability distribution, then
selects a random variable (with values in Si) that realizes that distribution, then observes a realization of
that random variable, and then plays accordingly. Implicit in this description is that the random variables
available to Player 1 are statistically independent of those available to Player 2.
In the real world, however, this isn’t always true. In the extreme case, both agents might be able to
observe the same random variable—such as the price of wheat as reported in the Wall Street Journal . We
can model this extreme case by replacing G with a set of games {Gα}, one for each value α of the jointly
observed random variable. We then analyze each game Gα separately.
But in less extreme cases, we need a new concept. An environment for G is a pair (X1,X2), where
Xi is a set of Si-valued random variables. (We do not assume that random variables in X1 are necessarily
independent of those in X2.) It is natural to assume that for any X ∈ Xi and any map σ : Si → Si, the
random variable σ ◦X is also in Xi. (This models the notion that players should be able to map realizations
to strategies any way they want to.)
Given such an environment, we define a new game G(E) = G(X1,X2) as follows:
Player i’s strategy set is Xi. The payoff functions are defined in the obvious way, namely
Pi(X,Y ) =
∫
S1×S2
Pi(x, y)dµX,Y (x, y)
where µX,Y is the joint probability distribution on S1 × S2 induced by (X,Y ).
Definition IC.1. The pair of random variables (X,Y ) is called a correlated equilibrium in G if it is
a Nash equilibrium in the game G({X}, {Y }). Two correlated equilibria are equivalent if they induce
the same probability distribution on S1 × S2. We will frequently abuse language by treating equivalent
correlated equilibria as if they were identical.
It is easy to prove the following:
Proposition IC.2. Let E be an environment and suppose that (X,Y ) is a Nash equilibrium in the
game G(E). Then (X,Y ) is a correlated equilibrium in G.
However. the converse to IC.2 does not hold:
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Example IC.3. Let S1 = S2 = {C,D}. Let X , Y , and W be random variables such that
Prob(X =W = C) = Prob(X =W = D) = 1/8 Prob(X 6=W = C) = Prob(X 6=W = D) = 3/8
Prob(Y =W = C) = Prob(Y =W = D) = 1/12 Prob(Y 6=W = C) = Prob(Y 6=W = D) = 5/12
Let E = ({X,Y }, {W}). Let G be the game with the following payoffs:
Player Two
Player One
C D
C (0, 0) (2, 1)
D (1, 2) (0, 0)
It is easy to check that both (X,W ) and (Y,W ) yield correlated equilibria in G. But (X,W ) is not an
equilibrium in the game G(E), though (Y,W ) is.
1D. Games with Private Information.
In real world strategic interactions, either player might know something the other doesn’t. We model this
situation as a game of private information, consisting of two strategy spaces Si, two sets (called information
sets Ai, a probability distribution on A1 ×A2, and two payoff functions
Pi : A1 ×A2 × S1 × S2 → R
Given a game of private information, the associated game G# has strategy sets S#i = Hom(Ai, Si)
and payoff functions
P#i (F1, F2) =
∫
A1×A2
Pi(A1, A2, F1(A1), F2(A2))
(Here Hom(A,S) denotes the set of all functions from A to S.)
If G is a game of private information, a Nash equilibrium in G is (by definition) a Nash equilibrium in
the ordinary game G#.
Now we want to enrich the model so players can randomize. To this end, let E be an environment in
the sense of Section 1C; that is, E = (X1,X2) where Xi is a set of Si-valued random variables. We define
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the associated environment E# = (X1,X2) by setting X#i = Hom(Ai,Xi) and identifying the latter set with
a set of S#i -valued random variables.
Thus, if G is a game of private information with environment E, we can first “eliminate the private
information” by passing to the associated game G# and environment E#, and then “eliminate the random
variables” by passing to the associated game G#(E#) as in the discussion preceding Definition 1C.1. Now
we’re studying an ordinary game, where we have the ordinary notion of Nash equilibrium.
Unfortunately, this construction does not generalize to the quantum context . To get a construction
that generalizes, we need to proceed in the opposite order, by first eliminating the random variables and
then eliminating the private information:
Construction ID1. Given a game of private information G with an environment E = (X1,X2),
define a new game of private information G(E) as follows:
The information sets Ai and the probability distribution on A1 ×A2 are as in G. The strategy sets
are the Xi. The payoff functions are
Pi(A1, A2, X, Y ) =
∫
S1×S2
Pi(A1, A2, s1, s2)dµX,Y (s1, s2)
Now applying the # construction to G(E) gives an ordinary game G(E)#.
Theorem. G(E)# = G#(E#).
Remark. In spirit, and in the language of [K], G#(E#) is like the associated game with mixed
strategies , where player i chooses a probability distribution over maps Ai → Si, while G(E)# is like the
associated game with behavioral strategies , where player i chooses, for each element of Ai, a probability
distribution over Si. In [K], these games are equivalent in an appropriate sense; here they are actually the
same game. The difference is that in [K], players choose probability distributions whereas here they choose
random variables. But the two approaches are fundamentally equivalent.
IE. Quantum Game Theory
The notions of mixed strategy and correlated equilibria are meant to model the real-world behavior of
strategic agents who have access to randomizing technologies (such as weighted coins). Quantum game
theory is the analogous attempt to model the behavior of strategic agents who have access to quantum
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technologies (such as entangled particles).
Broadly speaking, there players might use these quantum technologies in either of two ways: As
randomizing devices or as communication devices. We will consider each in turn.
II. Quantum Randomization
IIA. Quantum Strategies. Just as the theory of mixed strategies models the behavior of players
with access to classical randomizing devices, the theory of quantum strategies models the behavior of players
with access to quantum randomizing devices. These devices provide players with access to families of
observable quantities that cannot be modeled as classical random variables.
For example, let X , Y , Z and W be binary random variables. Classically we have the near triviality:
Prob(X 6=W ) ≤ Prob(X 6= Y ) + Prob(Y 6= Z) + Prob(Z 6=W )
(Proof: Imagine X,Y, Z,W lined up in a row; in order for X to differ from W , at least one of X,Y, Z,W
must differ from its neighbor.) But if X,Y, Z andW are quantum mechanical measurements, this inequality
need not hold. (The most obvious paradoxes are avoided by the fact that neither X and Z, nor Y and W ,
are simultaneously observable.)
To model the behavior of agents who can make such measurements, we can mimic the definitions
(I.C.1) and (I.C.2), replacing the sets Xi of random variables with sets Xi of quantum mechanical
observables. We require that any X ∈ X1 and any Y ∈ X2 be simultaneously observable. We call such
a pair E = (X1,X2) a quantum environment . (Quantum environments will be defined more precisely in
Section II.B below.) Given such a quantum environment and given a game G, we construct a new game
G(E) just as in the discussion preceding Definition IC.1.
If (X,Y ) is a Nash equilibrium in G(E), we sometimes speak loosely enough to say that (X,Y ) is a
quantum equilibrium in G, though the property of being a quantum equilibrium depends not just on G but
on the environment E. Two quantum equilibria are called equivalent if they induce the same probability
distribution on S1 × S2, and, as with correlated equilibria, we will sometimes speak of equivalent quantum
equilibria as if they were identical.
If (X,Y ) is a quantum equilibrium then (by the definition of quantum environment), X and Y are
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simultaneously observable and hence can be treated as classical random variables. With this identification,
it is easy to show that any quantum equilibrium is a correlated equilibrium. (This generalizes Proposition
IC.2.) However, just as in Example IC.3, the converse need not hold. A pair (X,Y ) that is an equilibrium
in one quantum environment need not be an equilibrium in another.
IIB. The Quantum Environment
Consider a game in which the strategy sets are S1 = S2 = {C,D}. Players can implement (ordinary
classical) mixed strategies by flipping (weighted) pennies, mapping the outcome “heads” to the strategy C
and the outcome “tails” to the strategy D.
While a classical penny occupies either the state H(heads up) or T (tails up), a quantum penny can
occupy any state of the form ψ = αH+βT, where α and β are complex scalars, not both zero. A heads/tails
measurement of such a penny yields the outcome either H or T with probabilities proportional to |α|2 and
|β|2. Physical actions such as rotating the penny induce unitary transformations of the state space, so that
the state ψ is replaced by Uψ where U is some unitary operator on the complex vector space C2.
(Of course literal macroscopic pennies do not behave this way, but spin-1/2 particles such as electrons
do, with “heads” and “tails” replaced by “spin up” and “spin down”.)
A single quantum penny is no more or less useful than a classical randomizing device. If you want to
play heads with probability p, you can first apply a unitary transformation that converts the state to some
γH+ δT with |γ|2/(|γ|2 + |δ2|) = p, then measure the heads/tails state of the penny and play accordingly.
However, two players equipped with quantum pennies have something more than a classical randomizing
device. A pair of quantum pennies occupies a state of the form
αH⊗H+ βH⊗T+ γT⊗H+ δT⊗T
where α, β, γ, δ are complex scalars, not all zero. A physical manipulation of the first penny transforms the
first factor unitarily and a physical manipulation of the second penny transforms the second factor unitarily.
Subsequent measurements yield the outcomes (heads,heads), (heads,tails) and so forth with probabilities
proportional to |α|2, |β|2 and so forth. This allows the players to achieve joint probability distributions
that cannot be achieved via the observations of independent random variables.
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Example II.B.1. Suppose that two pennies begin in the maximally entangled state H⊗H+T⊗T.
Players One and Two apply the transformations U and V to the first and second pennies where
U =
(
cos(θ) sin(θ)
− sin(θ) cos(θ)
)
V =
(
cos(φ) sin(φ)
− sin(φ) cos(φ)
)
This converts the state from H⊗H+T⊗T to
UH⊗ VH+ UT⊗ VT = cos(θ − φ)H⊗H+ sin(θ − φ)H⊗T− sin(θ − φ)T ⊗H+ cos(θ − φ)T ⊗T
If players map the outcomes H and T to the strategies C and D, then the resulting probability distri-
bution over strategy pairs is
Prob(C,C) = Prob(D,D) = cos2(θ − φ)/2 Prob(C,D) = Prob(D,C) = sin2(θ − φ)/2
We can now make precise the notion of quantum environment; a quantum enviroment is a triple
(ξ,X1,X2) where
a) ξ is a non-zero vector in a complex vector space Cn1 ⊗Cn2 (with n1 and n2 assumed finite here,
though this could all be generalized)
b) Xi is a set of unitary operators on Cni .
The unitary operators fill the same role as the sets of random variables in Section I; they are the things
that players can observe, and on whose realizations they can condition their strategies.
IIC. Quantum Equilibrium
Consider again the game G from Example IC.3:
Player Two
Player One
C D
C (0, 0) (2, 1)
D (1, 2) (0, 0)
Let E be the following quantum environment: ξ = H⊗H + T⊗T where {H,T} is a basis for the
complex vector space C2; X1 = X2 is the set of all operators that take the form
M(θ) =
(
cos(θ) sin(θ)
− sin(θ) cos(θ)
)
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when expressed in terms of the basis {H,T}.
Physically, this means that each player has access to one member of a pair of maximally entangled
pennies, and can rotate that penny through any angle before measuring it’s heads/tails orientation.
Taking Player Two’s angle φ as given, Player One clearly optimizes by choosing θ so that sin(θ−φ) = 1,
and symmetrically for Player One. Thus in equilibium, the outcomes (2,1) and (1,2) are each realized with
probability 1/2.
As we’ve noted earlier, this is of course a correlated equilibrium, but it is more than that. For example,
the correlated equilibria (X,W ) and (Y,W ) of Example IC.3 are not sustainable as quantum equilibria in
this environment.
IID. Quantum Games of Private Information
Let G be a game of private information as defined in Section ID, and let E be a quantum environment.
We would like to model the play of G in the environment E as the play of an ordinary game. A natural
attempt is to replace G with the game G# defined in Section ID; recall that a strategy in G# is a map from
the information set Ai to the strategy set Si. However, in the quantum case there is no natural way to define
an environment E# for this game. More precisely, it is shown in [DL] that the natural definition of E#
makes sense when and only when the measurements in X1∪X2 have a single joint probability distribution, so
that they can be thought of as classical random variables. In other words, the existence of an environment
E# is equivalent to the absence of any specifically quantum phenomena.
Therefore we must generalize not the construction G#(E#) from Section ID, but the classically equiv-
alent construction G(E)#. In the language of [K] (and of the remark at the end of Section ID), quantum
game theory allows players to choose behavioral strategies without equivalent mixed strategies.
Example IID.1. Let G be the following game of private information:
The information sets are A1 = A2 = {red,green}. The probability distribution on A1 ×A2 is uniform.
The payoff functions are specified as follows:
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IF BOTH PLAYERS OBSERVE RED
Player Two
Player One
C D
C (1, 1) (0, 0)
D (0, 0) (1, 1)
IF EITHER PLAYER OBSERVESGREEN
Player Two
Player One
C D
C (0, 0) (1, 1)
D (1, 1) (0, 0)
The environment E is as in IIC.
In the game G(E)#, players choose maps Ai → Xi.
To find equilibria in this game, suppose that Players One has chosen to map “red” and “green” to
M(θred) and M(θgreen), while Player Two has chosen M(φred) and M(φgreen) (where the M matrices are as
defined in Section IC.) Then we can compute Player One’s expected payoffs as functions on A1 ×A2:
EP1(red, red) = cos
2(θred − φred) (IID.1)
EP1(red, green) = sin
2(θred − φgreen) (IID.2)
EP1(green, red) = sin
2(θgreen − φred) (IID.3)
EP1(green, green) = sin
2(θgreen − φgreen) (IID.4)
Because the probability distribution on A1 ×A2 is uniform, Player One seeks to maximize the sum of
these four expressions, taking φred and φgreen as given. At the same time (due to the symmetry of the
problem) Player Two seeks to maximize the identical sum, taking θred and θgreen as given.
Given this, we can compute that there are two types of equilibria:
a) Equilibria in which exactly three of the four expressions (IID.1)-(IID.4) are equal to 1 and the
fourth is equal to 0. All four possibilities occur with φr, φg, θr, θg ∈ {0, pi2 , pi}. In these equilibria
each player receives a payoff of 3/4 = .75.
b) Equilibria equivalent to {φred = 0, φgreen = 3pi/4, θred = pi/8, θgreen = 3pi/8}. In these equilibria
each player receives a payoff of (1/2 +
√
2/4) ≈ .85.
The best equilibrium that can be reached in any classical environment is equivalent to an equilibrium
of type a). This is so even when the classical environment includes correlated random variables.
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For ordinary games, we observed that every quantum equilibrium is also a correlated equilibrium. For
games of private information, this example demonstrates that no analogous statement is true.
III. Quantum Communication
IIIA. Communication
In any real world implementation of a game, players must somehow communicate their strategies before
they can receive payoffs. This follows from the fact that the payoff functions take both players’ strategies
as arguments; therefore information about both strategies must somehow be present at the same place and
time.
Ordinarily, the communication process is left unmodeled. But in this section, we need an explicit model
so that we can explore the effects of allowing quantum communication technology. To that end we postulate
a referee who communicates with the players by handing them markers (say pennies) which the players can
transform from one state to another (say by flipping them over or leaving them unflipped) to indicated
their strategy choices; the markers are eventually returned to the referee who examines them and computes
payoffs.
Of course not all real world games have literal referees; sometimes the players are firms, their strategies
are prices, and the prices are communicated not to a referee but to a marketplace, where payoffs are “com-
puted” via market processes. In the models to follow, the referee can be understood as a metaphor for such
processes.
IIIB. A Quantum Move
Consider the game with the following payoff matrix (for now, view the labelsNN,NF, etc., as arbitrary
labels for strategies):
Player Two
Player One
N F
NN (1, 0) (0, 1)
NF (0, 1) (1, 0)
FN (0, 1) (1, 0)
FF (1, 0) (0, 1)
As noted above, classical game theory does not ask how players communicate with the referee. If we
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want to embellish our model with an explicit communication protocol, there are several essentially equivalent
ways to do it.
IIIB.1. The Simplest Protocol: The referee passes two pennies to Player One, who flips both to
indicate a play of FF, flips only the first to indicate a play of FN, and so forth, and one penny to Player
Two, who flips (F) or does not (N). The pennies are returned to the referee, who examines their states and
makes payoffs accordingly.
IIIB.2. An Alternative Protocol: A single penny in state H is passed to Player One, who either
flips or doesn’t; the penny is then passed to Player Two, who either flips or doesn’t; the penny is then
returned to the Player One, who either flips or doesn’t; the penny is then returned to the referee who makes
payoffs of (1,0) if the final state is H or (0,1) if the final state is T. (The players are blindfolded and cannot
observe each others’ plays.)
We can set things up so that flipping and not-flipping correspond to the applications of the unitary
matrices
F =
(
0 1
−i 0
)
N =
(
1 0
0 1
)
Now suppose that Player One manages to cheat by employing arbitrary unitary operations. Under the
simplest protocol IIIB.1, this is equivalent to playing a mixed strategy and gives Player One no advantage.
But under the alternative protocol, Player One can guarantee himself a win by choosing the unitary matrix
U =
1
2
(
1 + i
√
2
−√2 1− i
)
on his first turn and U−1 on his second. This guarantees him a win because U−1 ◦ F ◦ U and U−1 ◦N ◦ U
are both diagonal matrices, so that both fix the state H. (Recall that states are unchanged by scalar
multiplication.) In other words, the final state is now H regardless of Player Two’s strategy.
Note that it might be quite impossible to prohibit Player One from employing the matrix U , for exactly
the same reason that it is usually quite impossible to prohibit players for adopting mixed strategies: When
the referee makes his final measurement, the only information revealed is the final state of the penny, not
the process by which it achieved that state.
This example, due to David Meyer ([M]), illustrates two points: First, quantum communication can
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matter. Second, whether or not quantum communication matters depends not just on the game G; it
depends on the specified communications protocol.
IIIC. The Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein Protocol
The Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein protocol ([EW],[EWL]) captures the potential effects of quantum com-
munication in a quite general context and is therefore the most studied protocol in games of quantum
communication.
We start with a game G in which the strategy sets are S1 = S2 = {C,D}. (Everything can be
generalized to larger strategy sets, but we will stick to this simplest case.) The referee prepares a pair of
pennies in the state H⊗H+T⊗T, and passes one penny to each player, with Player One receiving the
“left-hand” penny.
Players are instructed to play operate with one of the unitary matrices F and N of Section IIIB, with F
indicating a desire to play D and N a desire to play C. Players actually operate with the unitary matrices
of their choices and then return the pennies to the referee, who makes a measurement that distinguishes
among the four states that could result if the players followed instructions.
We can of course model this situation by saying that the original game G has been replaced by the
associated quantum game GQ (not to be confused with the associated quantum games that arise in the very
different context of Section II), with strategy sets equal to the unitary group U2 (or, equivalently— because
states are unchanged by scalar multiplication— the special unitary group SU2) and payoff functions have
the obvious definition. It is observed in [L] that GQ is equivalent to the following game:
• The strategy sets SQi are both equal to the group of unit quaternions (which is isomorphic to the
special unitary group SU2)
• The payoff functions are defined as follows:
PQi (p,q) = A
2Pi(C,C) +B
2Pi(C,D) + C
2Pi(D,C) +D
2Pi(D,D)
where Pi is the payoff function in G and where
pq = A+Bi + Cj +Dk
The group structure on the strategy sets guarantees that (except in the uninteresting case where both
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payoff functions are maximized at the same arguments) there can be no pure-strategy equilibria in this
game, because Player One, taking Player Two’s strategy q as given, can always choose p to maximize his
own payoff, in which case Player Two cannot be maximizing. So the game GQ is quite uninteresting unless
we allow mixed strategies.
A mixed strategy in GQ is a probability measure on the strategy space SQ1 = SU2 = S
3 where S3 is
the three-sphere. Thus the strategy spaces in (GQ)mixed are quite large. However, it is shown in [L] that
in equilibrium, both players can be assumed to adopt strategies supported on at most four points, and that
each set of four points must lie in one of a small number of highly restrictive geometric configurations. This
considerably eases the problem of searching for equilibria.
Example IIIC.1. The Prisoner’s Dilemma. Consider the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” game
Player Two
Player One
C D
C (3, 3) (0, 5)
D (5, 0) (1, 1)
There is only one Nash equilibrium, only one (classical) mixed strategy equilibrium, and only one
(classical) correlated equilibrium, namely (D,D) in every case. But it is an easy exercise to check that there
are multiple mixed-strategy equilibria in the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein game GQ.
First example: Each player chooses any four orthogonal quaternions and plays each of the four with
equal probability. This induces the probability distribution in which each of the four payoffs is equiprobable
and each player earns an expected payoff of 9/4.
Second example: Player One plays the quaternions 1 and i with equal probability and Player Two plays
the quaternions j and k with equal probability. This induces the probability distribution where the payoffs
(0, 5) and (5, 0) each occur with probability 1/2 so that each player earns an expected payoff of 5/2.
The techniques of [L] reveal that, up to a suitable notion of equivalence, these are the only mixed
strategy equilibria in GQ.
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